

Secure Coding Standards


Lotfi ben Othmane

Most of the examples are taken from
<https://www.securecoding.cert.org/>

What a SDLC is Up To?

- Is SDLC sufficient to producing secure software?
- Does SDLC?
 - **Ensure** development of secure software?
 - **lead** to developing secure software?
 - **support** developing secure software?

Vulnerabilities Distribution




Source: www.cvedetails.com

Types of Vulnerabilities

- Design-based vulnerabilities
 - E.g., Broken access control, data leakage due to logic flaw
- Language-based vulnerabilities
 - E.g., Buffer overflow, XSS

Misplaced Trust

- Different components may have different trust levels
- Data coming from **untrusted** component **should** be **validated** before used by a **trusted** component.
- Example of certificate authority of The Netherlands where the certificate signing system was hosted with a publicly accessible Web application (accessed using non-changed default password)



Secure Programming Overview

- How SQL injection attack works?
- How XSS attack works?
- How buffer overflow attack works?

- How to prevent them?

- What is the relation between programming languages and vulnerabilities?

Injection Attacks

- Attack examples
 - Command injection
 - SQL injection
 - XSS
- Solution
 - ✓ Data validation – data are valid input
 - ✓ Sanitization – ensure conformance of input to a set requirements, by e.g., removing some characters
 - ✓ Canonicalization – reduce the data to minimum, e.g., file path

Secure Programming Overview

- **Secure programming** (aka defensive coding) refers to coding rules and practices that help **avoiding known code vulnerabilities**.
- There are several secure coding standards, such as CERT, OWASP, NIST.
- Organizations develop their own APIs to **avoid** known vulnerabilities. E.g., data validation.
- We give in this lecture some advices on how to avoid a set of well known attack vectors.

Secure Programming Overview

- › Rule 04. Characters and String
- › Rule 05. Object Orientation (O
- › Rule 06. Methods (MET)
- ▼ **Rule 07. Exceptional Behavior**
 - ERR00-J. Do not suppress o
 - ERR01-J. Do not allow excep
 - ERR02-J. Prevent exception:
 - ERR03-J. Restore prior obje
 - ERR04-J. Do not complete a
 - ERR05-J. Do not let checker
 - ERR06-J. Do not throw unde
 - ERR07-J. Do not throw Runti
 - ERR08-J. Do not catch NullF
 - ERR09-J. Do not allow untru
- › Rule 08. Visibility and Atomicit
- › Rule 09. Locking (LCK)
- › Rule 10. Thread APIs (THI)
- › Rule 11. Thread Pools (TPS)
- › Rule 12. Thread-Safety Miscell
- › Rule 13. Input Output (FIO)
- › Rule 14. Serialization (SER)

Rule 07. Exceptional Behavior (ERR)

Created by Dhruv Mohindra, last modified by David Svoboda on Mar 11, 2020

Rules

- ERR00-J. Do not suppress or ignore checked exceptions
- ERR01-J. Do not allow exceptions to expose sensitive information
- ERR02-J. Prevent exceptions while logging data
- ERR03-J. Restore prior object state on method failure
- ERR04-J. Do not complete abruptly from a finally block
- ERR05-J. Do not let checked exceptions escape from a finally block
- ERR06-J. Do not throw undeclared checked exceptions
- ERR07-J. Do not throw RuntimeException, Exception, or Throwable
- ERR08-J. Do not catch NullPointerException or any of its ancestors
- ERR09-J. Do not allow untrusted code to terminate the JVM

Risk Assessment Summary

Rule	Severity	Likelihood	Remediation Cost	Priority	Level
ERR00-J	Low	Probable	Medium	P4	L3
ERR01-J	Medium	Probable	High	P4	L3
ERR02-J	Medium	Likely	High	P6	L2
ERR03-J	Low	Probable	High	P2	L3

Injection Attacks-2

- `SELECT * FROM db_user WHERE username='validuser' OR '1'='1' AND password=<PASSWORD>`

- **Non-Compliant**

```
String sqlString = "SELECT * FROM db_user WHERE username = '"  
+ username + "' AND password = '" + pwd + "'";  
Statement stmt = connection.createStatement();  
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(sqlString);
```

- **Compliant**

```
String sqlString = "select * from db_user where username=? and password=?";  
PreparedStatement stmt = connection.prepareStatement(sqlString);  
stmt.setString(1, username);  
stmt.setString(2, pwd);  
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery();
```

Memory Mis-Management

```
# include <stdlib .h>
# include <stdio .h>
# include <string .h>
```

```
int bof( char *str) {
    char buffer [24];
    strcpy ( buffer , str );
    return 1;
}
```

```
int main (int argc , char ** argv ) {
    char str [517];
    FILE * badfile ;
    badfile = fopen (" badfile ", "r");
    fread (str , sizeof ( char ), 517 , badfile );
    bof (str );
    printf (" Returned properly \n");
    return 1;}
}
```

What is the vulnerability here?
How to avoid it?

Memory Mis-Management-2

```
# include <stdlib .h>
# include <stdio .h>
# include <string .h>
```

Example of solutions

```
int bof( char *str) {
    char buffer [24];
    buffer[23] = '\0';
    strncpy ( buffer , str, 23);
    return 1;
}
```

```
int main (int argc , char ** argv ) {
    char str [517];
    FILE * badfile ;
    badfile = fopen (" badfile ", "r");
    fread (str , sizeof ( char ), 517 , badfile );
    bof (str );
    printf (" Returned properly \n");
    return 1;}
}
```

Memory Mis-Management-3

Other rules

<https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=437>

- MEM30-C. Do not access freed memory
- MEM31-C. Free dynamically allocated memory when no longer needed
- MEM33-C. Allocate and copy structures containing a flexible array member dynamically
- MEM34-C. Only free memory allocated dynamically
- MEM35-C. Allocate sufficient memory for an object
- MEM36-C. Do not modify the alignment of objects by calling `realloc()`

Data Leakage

How can the data be leaked?

```
public class Credentials implements
Serializable {
    private string password;
    public string password) {
        this. password = password;
    }
}
```

```
public class usepassword extends Credentials {
    public static void main(String[] args) {
        FileOutputStream fout = null;
        try {
            Credentials p = new Credentials("SecretPassword");
            fout = new FileOutputStream("Credentials.ser");
            ObjectOutputStream oout = new
ObjectOutputStream(fout);
            oout.writeObject(p);
        } catch (Throwable t) {
            // Forward to handler
        } finally {
            if (fout != null) {
                try {
                    fout.close();
                } catch (IOException x) {
                    ....
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
```

Data Leakage-2

```
public class Credentials implements
Serializable {
    private String password;

    public Credentials (String password) {
        PerformSecurityManageCheck();
        this. password = password;
    }
}
```

```
public class usepassword extends credentials {
    public static void main(String[] args) {
        FileOutputStream fout = null;
        try {
            Credentials p = new
Credentials("SecretPassword");
            fout = new
FileOutputStream("Credentials.ser");
            ObjectOutputStream oout = new
ObjectOutputStream(fout);
            oout.writeObject(p);
        } catch (Throwable t) {
            // Forward to handler
        } finally {
            ....
        }
    }
}
```

Does this solve the problem?

What about making the password field transient?

Denial of Service

- Causes include
 - Upload large files
 - Force infinite loops
 - Initiate many connections
 - Force deadlocks
 - Insert keys with the same hash code
 - Operate on mismanaged sharing of files
 - Force division by zero

Denial of Service

```
static final int BUFFER = 512;  
// ...
```

What is the problem?

```
public final void unzip(String filename) throws java.io.IOException{  
    FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(filename);  
    ZipInputStream zis = new ZipInputStream(new BufferedInputStream(fis));  
    ZipEntry entry;  
    try {  
        while ((entry = zis.getNextEntry()) != null) {  
            System.out.println("Extracting: " + entry);  
            int count;  
            byte data[] = new byte[BUFFER];  
            // Write the files to the disk  
            FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(entry.getName());  
            BufferedOutputStream dest = new BufferedOutputStream(fos, BUFFER);  
            while ((count = zis.read(data, 0, BUFFER)) != -1) {  
                dest.write(data, 0, count);  
            }  
            .....  
        }  
    }  
}
```

Denial of Service

```
static final int BUFFER = 512;
static final int TOOBIG = 0x6400000; // 100MB
// ...

public final void unzip(String filename) throws java.io.IOException{

.....
try {
    while ((entry = zis.getNextEntry()) != null) {
.....
        byte data[] = new byte[BUFFER];
        // Write the files to the disk, but only if the file is not insanely big
        if (entry.getSize() > TOOBIG ) {
            throw new IllegalStateException("File to be unzipped is huge.");
        }
        if (entry.getSize() == -1) {
            throw new IllegalStateException("File to be unzipped might be huge.");
        }
        FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(entry.getName());
        BufferedOutputStream dest = new BufferedOutputStream(fos, BUFFER);
        while ((count = zis.read(data, 0, BUFFER)) != -1) {
            dest.write(data, 0, count);}

.....
    } finally {
        zis.close();}}
}
```

Does this solve the problem?

<https://www.securecoding.cert.org/>

Exception Handling

How difficult it is to read sensitive files?

```
class ExceptionExample {  
    public static void main(String[] args) throws FileNotFoundException {  
        // Linux stores a user's home directory path in  
        // the environment variable $HOME, Windows in %APPDATA%  
        FileInputStream fis =  
            new FileInputStream(System.getenv("APPDATA") + args[0]);  
    }  
}
```

Exception Handling-2

```
class ExceptionExample {
    public static void main(String[] args) {

        File file = null;
        try {
            file = new File(System.getenv("APPDATA") +
                args[0]).getCanonicalFile();
        } catch (IOException x) {
            System.out.println("Invalid file");
            return;
        }

        try {
            FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(file);
        } catch (FileNotFoundException x) {
            System.out.println("Invalid file");
            return;
        }
    }
}
```

Does this solve the problem?

Exception Handling-3

```
public class Operation {
    public static void doOperation(String some_file) {
        // ... Code to check or set character encoding ...
        try {
            BufferedReader reader =
                new BufferedReader(new FileReader(some_file));
            try {
                // Do operations
            } finally {
                reader.close();
                // ... Other cleanup code ...
            }
        } catch (IOException x) {
            // Forward to handler
        }
    }
}
```

Exception Handling-3

```
public static void doOperation(String some_file) {  
    // ... Code to check or set character encoding ...  
    try ( // try-with-resources  
        BufferedReader reader =  
            new BufferedReader(new FileReader(some_file))) {  
        // Do operations  
    } catch (IOException ex) {  
        System.err.println("thrown exception: " + ex.toString());  
        Throwable[] suppressed = ex.getSuppressed();  
        for (int i = 0; i < suppressed.length; i++) {  
            System.err.println("suppressed exception: "  
                + suppressed[i].toString());  
        }  
        // Forward to handler  
    }  
}
```

Java SE 7 introduced a feature called *try-with-resources*

Cryptographic Weaknesses

- Causes include:
 - Use of weak cryptographic algorithms
 - E.g., DES encryption shall not be used anymore
 - Use of weak parameters
 - E.g., RSA encryption key of 1024 is weak
 - Wrong use of APIs
 - Wrong order of API calls
 - Bypass illegitimately errors and warnings

Cryptographic Weaknesses-2

- Weak

```
public static byte[] encrypt(String plainText, String encryptionKey) throws Exception {  
    Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("DES/CBC/NoPadding", "SunJCE");  
    SecretKeySpec key = new SecretKeySpec(encryptionKey.getBytes("UTF-8"),  
    "DES");  
    cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key, new IvParameterSpec(IV.getBytes("UTF-8")));  
    return cipher.doFinal(plainText.getBytes("UTF-8"));  
}
```

- Good

```
public static byte[] encrypt(String plainText, String encryptionKey) throws Exception {  
    Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding", "SunJCE");  
    SecretKeySpec key = new SecretKeySpec(encryptionKey.getBytes("UTF-8"),  
    "AES");  
    cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key, new IvParameterSpec(IV.getBytes("UTF-8")));  
    return cipher.doFinal(plainText.getBytes("UTF-8"));  
}
```

Unauthenticated Method Calls

- Causes include
 - (illegitimate) Call of methods of frameworks/Libraries used by other co-hosted software
 - (illegitimate) Injection of method calls for libraries that accept dynamically generated code

Mis-configuration

- Causes include
 - Sensitive information, such as database passwords are kept in Web application configuration
 - Providing debugging information
 - Etc.

Conclusions

- **Secure programming** (aka defensive coding) refers to **coding rules** and **practices** that help avoiding known code vulnerabilities.
 - The rules and practices are, in general, technology-dependent
 - Developers shall apply these rules and practices
- Organizations develop APIs that help avoiding vulnerabilities such as malicious input
- Applying the recommended rules and principles does not imply safety from code-vulnerabilities
 - Last year an attacker succeeded in bypassing a rule for executing code embedded in JPEG images on WordPress

Thank you

Any Question?